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INTRODUCTION 
Everyday while working as a writers’ assistant for the popular 
television sitcom “Friends,” Amaani Lyle witnessed the show’s writers 
continuously make sex-related jokes, discuss blow job stories, 
reference the actresses’ sexuality, write sex-related words on scripts, 
and pantomime masturbation.1  After four months of transcribing 
story line discussions, the supervising writers fired Lyle for her poor 
typing skills and for her failure to accurately record important jokes 
and dialogue in her notes.2 
Following her dismissal, Lyle sued the individuals and organizations 
involved in producing “Friends” under California’s Fair Employment 
and Housing Act based on race and gender harassment.3  The Los 
Angeles County Superior Court dismissed Lyle’s complaint as 
frivolous.4  The Court of Appeal of California for the Second District 
reversed and remanded in part, holding that the case presented 
triable issues of fact regarding sexual harassment.5  Although the 
Court of Appeal concluded that the trier of fact could find that the 
writers’ room on “Friends” constituted a hostile work environment,6 it 
also instructed that the trier of fact could consider the nature of the 
defendants’ work in determining if their conduct amounted to a 
hostile work environment.7  By co-opting the defendants’ argument 
                                                          
 1. See Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prod., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 511, 516 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2004), cert. granted, 94 P.3d 476 (Cal. 2004) (No. S125271) (describing further 
the defendants’ habits of drawing enlarged genitalia on cheerleaders’ bodies in a 
pornographic coloring book in Lyle’s presence); Appellant’s Answer Brief on the 
Merits at 20, Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prod., 94 P.3d 476 (Cal. filed Nov. 19, 
2004) (No. S125271), 2004 WL 3256430 [hereinafter Appellant’s Answer Brief]  
(recounting that the defendants openly and indiscriminately discussed Courtney 
Cox’s fertility, commenting that her “pussy was full of dried up twigs” and that “if her 
husband put his dick in her she’d break in two”). 
 2. See Lyle, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 513 (asserting that because the writers fired Lyle 
for her poor typing skills and failure to accurately record notes, they terminated her 
employment based on nondiscriminatory factors). 
 3. See id. (noting that Lyle’s first complaint alleged that the defendants 
terminated her in retaliation for regularly complaining that the show had no black 
characters, but later amended her complaint to allege racial and sexual harassment). 
 4. See id. (recounting that the lower court granted the defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment because Lyle could not establish that the defendants terminated 
her on the basis of race or sex discrimination). 
 5. See id. at 515 (citing Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 262 Cal. Rptr. 842, 
853 n.8 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)) (stating that an employee subjected to a hostile work 
environment is a victim even though coworkers or supervisors do not direct offensive 
remarks at the employee). 
 6. See id. at 517 n.59 (concluding that Lyle provided sufficient evidence to make 
a prima facie case of sexual harassment because the record showed that the 
defendants constantly engaged in crude and vulgar discussions about anal and oral 
sex using the words “fuck,” “blow job,” and “schlong”). 
 7. See id. at 518 (acknowledging the defendants’ argument that vulgar, crude, 
and disparaging language does not always support liability in the context of a creative 
3
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and creating the creative necessity defense, the Court of Appeal 
allowed for the “Friends” writers to avoid hostile work environment 
liability if they could prove that discussing sexual exploits, making 
lewd gestures, and displaying crude pictures denigrating women fell 
within the scope of necessary job performance.8 
This Note argues that the California Court of Appeal incorrectly 
formulated the creative necessity defense because it is both 
inconsistent with the legislative intent of federal and state anti-
discrimination laws and unnecessary given the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services Inc.  Part II of this 
Note traces the development of the hostile work environment sexual 
harassment doctrine9 and provides a detailed summary of Lyle v. 
Warner Brothers Television Productions.10  Part III argues that the 
creative necessity defense undermines anti-discrimination 
principles.11 Part IV discusses the implications of the creative necessity 
defense for employers and employees in television production and 
offers recommendations for the Supreme Court of California.12  Part 
V concludes that courts should not recognize the creative necessity 
defense in sexual harassment cases.13 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment Doctrine 
Evolved from Judicial Interpretation of Title VII 
1. The Beginning: Title VII and Its Failure to Define Discrimination 
Based on Sex 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the centerpiece of federal 
                                                          
environment when the writers acted within the capacity of their job by generating 
ideas for an adult-oriented situation comedy). 
 8. See id. at 520 (analogizing the creative necessity defense to the business 
necessity defense to disparate impact discrimination, and allowing the defendants to 
convince a jury that the creative process for producing “Friends” required conduct 
that is considered harassment in other contexts). 
 9. See infra Part II (discussing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, and the defenses to discrimination). 
 10. See infra Part II.D (detailing the conduct Lyle faced while working at Warner 
Brothers, as well as outlining the case’s procedural history). 
 11. See infra Part III (explaining that the creative necessity defense is 
inappropriate in sexual harassment cases because it is modeled after a disparate 
impact defense). 
 12. See infra Part IV (recommending that the Supreme Court of California follow 
Oncale’s totality of the circumstances test, which includes a consideration of social 
context). 
 13. See infra Part V (concluding that the Court of Appeal’s creative necessity 
defense is an unsound legal invention). 
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legislation aimed at eliminating workplace discrimination.14  
However, at its passage, Title VII did not define sexual harassment as 
discrimination, nor did its legislative history offer guidance as to 
whether sexual harassment was a form of discrimination.15  The 
statute only made it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against 
any individual with respect to his [or her] compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual’s 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 16  Consequently, the 
courts struggled to determine what constituted actionable sex 
discrimination.17 
Despite Title VII’s ambiguity and the lack of legislative guidance 
regarding the definition of discrimination, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit first recognized that a hostile work 
environment could constitute actionable discrimination in Rogers v. 
EEOC.18  The Rogers court reasoned that Title VII prohibited 
discriminatory working environments that could destroy the 
emotional and psychological stability of minority employees; thus, 
statutory protection extended beyond economic or tangible 
discrimination.19 
Further clarifying the definition of discrimination, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)20 issued guidelines 
declaring hostile work environment sexual harassment a violation of 
Title VII.21  Although no court had considered hostile work 
                                                          
 14. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (stating that 
Congress’ objective in passing Title VII was to remove artificial, arbitrary, and 
unnecessary barriers to employment when they operate to invidiously discriminate on 
the basis of impermissible classifications); Diaz v. Pan Am. Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 
386 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that the legislature designed the statute to provide equal 
access to jobs for both men and women as evidenced by the plain language of Title 
VII). 
 15. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006) (failing specifically to 
define sex discrimination). 
 16. See id. 
 17. Compare Tompkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 
(D.N.J. 1976) (holding that sexual harassment and sexually motivated assault do not 
constitute sex discrimination under Title VII), with Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 
654, 663 (D.D.C. 1976) (finding that sexual harassment constituted discriminatory 
treatment under Title VII). 
 18. See 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (interpreting Title VII as an expansive 
concept that proscribed the practice of creating work environments heavily charged 
with racial or ethnic discrimination). 
 19. See id. (interpreting Title VII’s phrase “terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment” as evincing a congressional intention to define discrimination in the 
broadest possible terms). 
 20. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (granting the EEOC authority to ensure compliance 
with the federal civil rights laws guaranteeing nondiscriminatory employment). 
 21. See EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. §§ 
1604.11(a)-(f)(2005) (responding to the courts’ struggle to find hostile work 
environment sexual harassment an actionable claim, the EEOC embraced the Rogers 
5
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environment sexual harassment an actionable claim under Title VII,22 
the EEOC guidelines recognized that unwelcome sexual advances, 
requests for sexual favors, and other sexually-driven verbal and 
physical conduct constituted employee harassment, even if it did not 
affect the employee’s economic benefits.23  These guidelines, while 
not controlling upon the courts, served as a “body of experience and 
informed judgment” that the courts could consult in sexual 
harassment cases.24 
2. The Expansion: The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Title VII 
and the Hostile Work Environment Doctrine 
Relying on the Rogers precedent and the EEOC Guidelines, the 
Supreme Court made it clear that hostile work environment sexual 
harassment violated Title VII in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.25  
Mechelle Vinson worked as a bank teller and manager when her 
supervisor subjected her to unwelcome public fondling, repeated 
demands for sexual favors, and forcible rape.26  The Court ruled that 
Title VII did not require Vinson to suffer an economic or tangible 
detriment in order to establish a discriminatory environment; a 
hostile or abusive work environment was enough.27  Meritor limited 
the scope of Title VII by recognizing that not all harassing conduct 
                                                          
principle in its adopted guidelines). 
 22. See Susan Collins, Note, Harris v. Forklift Systems: A Modest Clarification of 
the Inquiry in Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment Cases, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 
1515, 1518 (stating that courts viewed hostile work environment sexual harassment 
cases as a natural consequence of personality quirks and male-female interaction and, 
consequently, did not recognize them); David M. Jaffe, Note, Walking the 
Constitutional Tightrope: Balancing Title VII Hostile Environment Sexual 
Harassment Claims with Free Speech Defenses, 80 MINN. L. REV. 979, 991 (1996) 
(noting that before the 1980s, most sex discrimination claims only involved quid pro 
quo harassment, the demand for sexual favors in exchange for economic or tangible 
job benefits). 
 23. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.11(a)-(f)(providing that sexual harassment, which 
unreasonably interferes with an individual’s work performance or creates an 
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment, violates Title VII). 
 24. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (quoting Gen. Elec. 
Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976)) (announcing that the EEOC guidelines 
support the finding that harassment causing non-economic injury constitutes 
actionable discrimination). 
 25. See id. at 73 (holding that a claim of hostile work environment sexual 
harassment is actionable under Title VII when a plaintiff suffers unwelcome sexual 
conduct that is sufficiently severe or pervasive). 
 26. See id. at 60 (acknowledging that Vinson’s toleration of sexual intercourse 
forty to fifty times, indecent exposure, and forcible rape as a condition of her 
employment created a hostile working environment). 
 27. See id. at 64 (explaining that the language of Title VII is not limited to sexual 
harassment resulting in economic discrimination because Congress intended to strike 
at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment). 
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affects the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.28  The 
Court affirmed that the sexual harassment must be sufficiently severe 
or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and 
create a hostile work environment for the complainant to have a 
cause of action.29  However, the Court failed to provide a clear 
definition of what satisfied this “severe or pervasive” threshold of 
harm requirement.30 
The Supreme Court clarified the degree of harm required for an 
employee to have a viable hostile work environment sexual 
harassment claim in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.31  Teresa Harris 
sued her employer for an abusive work environment, citing her 
supervisor’s conduct of calling her a “dumb ass woman” in front of 
customers, making sexual innuendos about her clothing, and asking 
her to remove items from his front pocket.32  The Supreme Court 
unanimously held that Harris did not have to suffer psychological 
injury or adverse impact to make a prima facie showing that her 
supervisor’s harassing conduct was sufficiently severe and pervasive, so 
long as a reasonable person would find the environment hostile and 
that she actually perceived it as abusive.33  In enunciating this 
objective-subjective component of the Meritor hostile work 
environment standard, the Supreme Court stated that an “all the 
circumstances” analysis is necessary to determine whether an 
                                                          
 28. See id. at 67 (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)) 
(announcing that the “mere utterance” of words that offend an employee would not 
alter the conditions of employment and, therefore, would not violate Title VII). 
 29. See id. at 66 (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 
1982)) (laying the foundation for the threshold a plaintiff must meet to make a prima 
facie showing of hostile work environment sexual harassment). 
 30. See Susan Deller Ross, Workplace Harassment, in SPEECH & EQUALITY: DO WE 
REALLY HAVE TO CHOOSE? 104 (Gara LaMarche ed., 1996) (remarking that Meritor 
did not resolve the controversy surrounding hostile work environment harassment 
because many courts still thought that a hypersensitive woman would build a case 
over mere words). Compare Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 
1986) (requiring serious effects on employee’s psychological well-being), with Ellison 
v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting Rabidue and stating that 
employees need not endure sexual harassment until it seriously affects their 
psychological well-being to bring a hostile work environment claim). 
 31. See 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (resolving a circuit split on whether conduct must 
cause serious psychological injury to be actionable as hostile work environment sexual 
harassment and finding that a plaintiff need not suffer psychological harm). 
 32. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (illuminating that the 
test for determining if harassing conduct violates Title VII is whether employers 
expose members of one sex to disadvantageous conditions of employment that 
members of the opposite sex are not exposed to, and whether the harassment 
interfered with the plaintiff’s work performance). 
 33. See id. at 21 (announcing a hostile work environment standard that struck a 
balance between punishing conduct that is merely offensive and conduct that causes 
tangible psychological injury). 
7
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environment would reasonably be perceived as hostile.34 
Despite the Supreme Court’s attempt to elaborate upon the Meritor 
hostile work environment standard in Harris, critics faulted the 
decision for its vague totality of the circumstances test.35  In Oncale v. 
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., the Supreme Court refined the 
test by instructing courts to consider the social context of the 
workplace when deciding sexual harassment cases.36  Joseph Oncale 
sued his employer for hostile work environment sexual harassment 
under Title VII after working on an oil platform where his male 
coworkers derided him for his alleged homosexuality, threatened 
rape, and physically assaulted him.37  Although the lower courts 
found that same-sex harassment was not actionable under Title VII, 
the Supreme Court concluded that the statute protects both men and 
women.38  Cautious not to transform Title VII into a federal civility 
code, the Court reiterated that the statute does not proscribe all 
verbal and physical harassment with sexual connotations.39  
Moreover, the Court emphasized that considering the workplace 
context when determining whether the harassment met the threshold 
requirement would prevent the possibility of imposing liability on 
such social behavior as flirtation and horseplay.40  The Supreme 
Court elaborated that the critical issue in hostile work environment 
cases is whether employees of one sex are unilaterally exposed to 
                                                          
 34. See id. at 23 (attempting to provide guidance on the totality of the 
circumstances test and suggesting that it may include: (1) the frequency and severity 
of the conduct; (2) whether the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating, or a 
mere offensive utterance; and (3) whether the conduct interferes with the employee’s 
work performance).  But see id. at 24 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the list of 
factors does little to clarify the vague hostile standard because it does not say how 
much of each element is necessary or identify any single factor as determinative). 
 35. See Collins, supra note 22, at 1537 (commenting that the Court could have 
proposed more specific requirements for its all the circumstances test, which would 
have made the test more circumscribed, limited consideration of improper 
stereotypes, and made the outcomes of hostile work environment cases more 
consistent). 
 36. See 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (finding that a totality of the circumstances inquiry 
requires consideration of the social context where the target experiences the 
harassing behavior so courts can distinguish between simple teasing and harassment). 
 37. See id. at 77 (detailing that Oncale’s supervisor failed to remedy the harassing 
and humiliating actions perpetrated by his coworkers, which forced Oncale to quit his 
job for fear of being raped and file suit). 
 38. See id. at 78-79 (holding that nothing in Title VII’s text or legislative history 
bars a claim of discrimination because the plaintiff and defendant are of the same 
sex). 
 39. See id. at 81 (arguing that conduct that a reasonable person would not find 
hostile or abusive is beyond the scope of Title VII). 
 40. See id. (illustrating that an analysis of social context would allow courts to 
differentiate between a football coach smacking his player on the buttocks and 
smacking his office secretary on the buttocks). 
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disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment.41 
B. California’s Sexual Harassment Law Parallels Title VII and Federal 
Precedent 
Section 12940 of California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act 
(“FEHA”), echoes the language of Title VII, making it unlawful for an 
employer to discriminate in terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment on the basis of sex.42  For hostile work environment 
sexual harassment to be actionable under section 12940 of FEHA, the 
harassment similarly must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter 
the conditions of the plaintiff’s employment and create an abusive 
working environment.43 
However, unlike Title VII, section 12490 explicitly recognizes 
hostile work environment harassment as unlawful discrimination.44  
FEHA also expressly defines harassment to include verbal, physical, 
and visual expressions or conduct.45 
C. The Two Theories of Discrimination Under Title VII and FEHA 
Title VII and FEHA recognize two theories of actionable 
discrimination: disparate treatment and disparate impact.46 Disparate 
treatment is intentional discrimination that occurs when an employer 
treats one group less favorably than another group on account of 
their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.47  Title VII and 
                                                          
 41. See id. at 81 (reading the statute as forbidding behavior so objectively 
offensive as to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment, but not interpreting it 
to mean that workplaces demand asexuality or androgyny). 
 42. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12490(a) (West 2005) (exemplifying that state 
legislatures consult federal decisions when drafting statutes that are synonymous in 
purpose). 
 43. See Beyda v. City of Los Angeles, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 547, 550 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1998)(stating that, although the wording of Title VII differs in some particulars from 
FEHA, the anti-discriminatory objectives and overriding public policy of the two acts 
are identical). 
 44. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940(j)(1) (stating that the plaintiff does not have to 
lose tangible job benefits to establish harassment). 
 45. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 7287.6 (West 2005) (providing a broader reading 
of harassment than Title VII by stating that actionable harassment under FEHA can 
include derogatory comments, physical interference with normal work, and 
derogatory drawings). 
 46. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 
713 n.1 (1983) (stating that the Court consistently distinguishes disparate treatment 
cases from cases involving neutral employment standards that have a disparate impact 
on minority applicants). 
 47. See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 
(1977) (declaring that disparate treatment, as the most easily understood type of 
discrimination, was the evil Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII); see also 
Kelly Cahill Timmons, Sexual Harassment and Disparate Impact: Should Non-
Targeted Workplace Conduct be Actionable Under Title VII?, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1152, 
9
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FEHA recognize sexual harassment as conduct that is discriminatory 
under a disparate treatment theory.48  Contrastingly, disparate impact 
discrimination results when an employer’s facially neutral 
employment practice disproportionately harms members of a 
protected class and lacks a business justification.49 
The Supreme Court first recognized the disparate impact theory in 
Griggs v. Duke Power Company, holding that Title VII prohibited 
both overt discrimination and facially neutral employment practices 
that were discriminatory in operation and unrelated to business 
necessity.50  This ruling established the business necessity defense to 
disparate impact discrimination, which Congress later codified as part 
of the amended Title VII via the Civil Rights Act of 1991.51 
Under the business necessity defense, courts will find otherwise 
unlawful employment practices legal, as long as less discriminatory 
alternatives are proven to be unavailable.52  Accordingly, an employer 
will not be held liable for disparate impact discrimination if it can 
prove that the challenged practice justifiably serves a legitimate 
business purpose.53 
The business necessity exception to Title VII and FEHA is defined 
in terms of job relatedness.54  The majority of disparate impact cases 
have applied the business necessity defense to challenges involving 
employment practices for hiring, assignments, promotion, transfers, 
                                                          
1154 (2003) (illustrating that the classic sexual harassment pattern involves a male 
supervisor propositioning a female subordinate for sex in exchange for retaining her 
employment, a demand he would likely not make of a male employee). 
 48. See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982) 
(explaining that sexual harassment is a pattern of behavior that inflicts disparate 
treatment on an employee with respect to terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment). 
 49. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (explaining that the 
plaintiff only needs to demonstrate that the facially neutral hiring practice selects 
applicants in a significantly discriminatory pattern and that, once the prima facie case 
of discrimination is established, the employer must meet the burden of showing that 
the challenged practice bears a manifest relationship to employment). 
 50. See 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (ruling that employers cannot maintain facially 
neutral employment practices if they freeze the status quo of prior discriminatory 
practices). 
 51. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e2(k)(1)(A)-(B) (2006) (establishing that an employer 
can rebut a disparate impact claim by showing that a challenged employment practice 
is a business necessity). 
 52. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 7286.7(b) (West 2005) (echoing Griggs and its 
progeny by codifying the business necessity defense to employment discrimination, 
which allows employers to avoid liability if there is not an alternative practice with a 
lesser discriminatory impact). 
 53. See id. (requiring that the practice serve the safe and efficient operation of 
the business, as well as fulfill the employer’s said business purpose). 
 54. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32, 436 (defining business necessity as related to 
job performance, having a manifest relationship to the employment in question, and 
measuring the person’s suitability for the job and not the person in the abstract). 
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and termination.55  However, courts have never recognized it as a 
defense to disparate treatment cases affecting conditions of 
employment.56 
D. The Facts and History of  Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television 
Productions 
1. Statement of the Case 
Lyle was hired as a writers’ assistant for “Friends” in June 1999.57  
She worked directly for Defendants Adam Chase, Greg Malins, and 
Andrew Reich taking notes in the writers’ room and compiling 
potential jokes and dialogue.58  During the interview, the writers 
informed Lyle that they discussed sex and told lewd jokes during the 
creative process.59  Lyle responded that she had worked at 
Nickelodeon where writers’ discussion often turned racy.60 
While employed as a writer’s assistant, Lyle spent fifty to seventy-five 
percent of her time working in the writers’ room.61 According to Lyle, 
the creative sessions included yelling, throwing things at the ceiling, 
                                                          
 55. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 442 (1982) (finding that an 
employer’s written promotion examination acted as a non-job related barrier and 
disparately impacted employees on account of their race in violation of Title VII); 
Xieng v. Peoples Nat’l Bank, 844 P.2d 389, 392 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (ruling that a 
bank’s good-faith belief that the employee’s accent would interfere with job 
performance was not a defense to national origin discrimination when conferring 
promotions). 
 56. See Timmons, supra note 47, at 1190 (offering that the limited use of the 
disparate impact theory in conditions of employment cases is based on the language 
of Title VII prior to its amendment by the Civil Rights Act of 1991); see also Teal, 457 
U.S. at 448 (stating that disparate impact arises from the language of section 
703(a)(2) of Title VII); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426 n.1 (citing only section 703(a)(2) of 
Title VII). 
 57. See Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prod., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 511, 513 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2004), cert. granted, 94 P.3d 476 (Cal. 2004) (No. S125271) (establishing the 
date Lyle began to work directly under Chase and Malins). 
 58. See id. (noting that the most important duty of a writers’ assistant was to type 
quickly to pick out ideas for future scripts).  However, the defendants did not test 
Lyle’s typing speed before hiring her.  Id. 
 59. See Respondent’s Opening Brief on the Merits at 13, Lyle v. Warner Bros. 
Television Prod., 94 P.3d 476 (Cal. filed Sept. 17, 2004) (No. S125271), 2004 WL 
2823287 [hereinafter Respondent’s Opening Brief] (claiming that Lyle said she was 
not a “babe in the woods” and understood that she would encounter sexual conduct 
during the production of “Friends”). 
 60. See id. at 13 n.3 (acknowledging Lyle’s familiarity with working on a situation 
comedy because she previously worked as a writers’ assistant on “Dream On,” where 
she heard frank sexual discussion and saw nudity during her tenure).  But see 
Appellant’s Answer Brief, supra note 1, at 12 (asserting that Warner Brothers never 
warned Lyle that writers would subject her to discussions about their own sexual 
conduct). 
 61. See Respondent’s Opening Brief, supra note 59, at 13 (explaining that the 
very nature of Lyle’s job required exposure to themes with sexual content). 
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and sexually explicit conduct.62 Lyle witnessed the defendants 
regularly refer to women as “cunts,” share their dating preference for 
blondes with certain cup sizes, and discuss blow jobs.63  Defendant 
Chase explained that, although these brainstorming sessions would 
become “silly” and continue in the common areas, the discussions 
would lead to interesting story lines and jokes.64 
After four months, the defendants terminated Lyle for poor job 
performance.65  During her exit interview, Lyle complained that her 
supervisors discriminated against her because of her gender and 
race.66  Shortly after her termination, Lyle filed complaints with the 
California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”), 
stating that the writers fired her because of her sex, race, and 
ancestry.67  Lyle did not assert that she had been harassed during her 
employment at “Friends” until she amended her complaint 
approximately one year later.68 
2. Procedural History 
Lyle’s first amended complaint alleged that the defendants’ 
employment practices violated FEHA and public policy because 
Warner Brothers terminated her due to her opposition to “Friends” 
                                                          
 62. See id. at 16 (describing the writers’ room as a locker room because the 
defendants were “pimply-faced teenagers” and “silly little boys” who engaged in 
“juvenile, counterproductive behavior”). 
 63. See Brief for Legal Aid Society-Employment Center et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Appellant at 2,3, Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prod., 94 P.3d 476 (Cal. 
2004) (No. S125271), 2005 WL 847604 [hereinafter Brief for Legal Aid](stating that 
producer Marta Kauffman did not permit the use of the word “cunt” in her presence 
because she found it offensive, thus providing the defendants notice of the 
abusiveness of this term).  However, the defendants continued to use the words 
“cunt,” “tits,” “pussy,” and “twat” when Kauffman was not present. Id. 
 64. See id. at 8 (emphasizing that the defendants engaged in conduct outside the 
writers’ room that consisted of calendar defacement, pornographic drawings, and 
loud sexist and racist speech).  Lyle argued that these offensive discussions in the 
hallway were not a part of the creative process of the writers’ room.  Id. 
 65. See Appellant’s Opening Brief at 8-9, Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prod., 
Cal. App. 4th 1164 (2004) (No. B160528), 2003 WL 23153558 (arguing that the 
reason given for Lyle’s termination was a pretext for retaliating against her for 
criticizing the show’s discriminatory hiring practices toward black actors).  
Defendants never put Lyle on notice that she was in jeopardy of losing her job, nor 
did they alert her to any deficiencies in her work.  Id. 
 66. See Appellant’s Answer Brief, supra note 1, at 15 (admitting that the human 
resources manager did not believe Lyle’s complaints warranted an investigation 
despite Warner Brothers’ policy requiring an investigation following sexual and racial 
discrimination claims). 
 67. See Respondent’s Opening Brief, supra note 59, at 16 (arguing that the 
defendants’ reason for terminating Lyle was a pretext for discrimination because they 
did not terminate other writers’ assistants who were slow typists). 
 68. See id. (suggesting that Lyle was not harassed because she was not touched, 
propositioned, threatened, demeaned, or the subject of any offensive statements in 
the writers’ room). 
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discriminatory hiring practices, her race, and her sex.69  The trial 
court granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment and 
attorney fees in the amount of $415,800.70  On appeal, the court 
reinstated Lyle’s harassment claims against the defendants, leaving 
the question as to whether the defendants conduct created a hostile 
work environment to a jury.71  The Court of Appeal also announced a 
creative necessity defense analogous to the business necessity defense, 
stating that the defendants could show that their conduct did not 
amount to harassment if it was within the scope of necessary job 
performance and not engaged in for purely personal gratification or 
other personal motives.72 
The Supreme Court of California granted the defendants’ petition 
for review, limiting review to whether the use of sexually coarse and 
vulgar language in the workplace constitutes sexual harassment under 
FEHA, and whether the imposition of liability for sexual harassment 
infringes the defendants’ free speech rights.73 After reviewing the 
case, the California Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motion 
for summary judgment, holding that Lyle did not establish a prima 
facie case of hostile work environment sexual harassment because her 
“meager facts” failed to show that the alleged conduct was severe or 
sufficiently pervasive.74 The court further ruled that, while sexually 
coarse and vulgar language may constitute workplace harassment, 
such conduct did not constitute sexual harassment in this case 
because the defendants’ comments were not personally directed at 
Lyle or other women because of sex.75 Because the California 
                                                          
 69. See Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prod., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 511, 513 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2004), cert. granted, 94 P.3d 476 (Cal. 2004) (No. S125271) (delineating 
common law causes of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policies 
against sex discrimination, in addition to Lyle’s FEHA suit). 
 70. See id. at 14 (rejecting Lyle’s FEHA cause of action because it was frivolous, 
unreasonable, and without foundation). 
 71. See id. (reversing the lower court’s ruling because triable issues of fact existed 
as to whether the defendants’ jobs necessitated their conduct). 
 72. See id. at 520 (citing Reno v. Baird, 957 P.2d 1333, 1336 (Cal. 1980)) (using 
the Supreme Court of California’s definition of harassment to support its argument 
that the defendants could answer a sexual harassment claim with a creative necessity 
defense). 
 73. See Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prod., 94 P.3d 476, 476 (Cal. 2004) 
(granting the defendants’ petition for review, but dismissing Lyle’s). 
 74. See Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prod., 38 Cal.4th 264, 272, 294 (2006) 
(finding that no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the comments were 
severe or sufficiently pervasive to create a hostile work environment in violation of 
FEHA). The court reasoned that the three instances cited by Lyle where the 
defendant’s used derogatory epithets coupled with evidence of the actress-related 
comments was not enough to establish triable issues of fact regarding hostile work 
environment sexual harassment. Id. at 290-91. 
 75. See id. at 287 (stating that the record showed that the sexual antics and 
discussions were not directed at Lyle or any other female employee because the 
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Supreme remanded the case based on its finding that Lyle did not 
meet the burden of proof under FEHA or Title VII and did not suffer 
disparate treatment, it never directly analyzed or overruled the Court 
of Appeal’s creative necessity defense.76 
II. ANALYSIS 
Consideration of the creative necessity defense in hostile work 
environment sexual harassment cases is unwarranted because: (1) 
there is no business necessity defense to disparate treatment to which 
the Court of Appeal’s newly minted defense might be compared to 
ensure its viability; (2) it does not comport with federal and state legal 
precedent; and (3) it disregards the legislative mandate to ensure 
equal employment opportunities for women and minorities. 
A. The Court of Appeal Wrongly Analogized its Creative Necessity 
Defense to the Business Necessity Defense 
The Court of Appeal correctly determined that Lyle presented 
triable issues of fact regarding sexual harassment, but it incorrectly 
applied the creative necessity defense as a variation of the business 
necessity defense.77  Under current common and statutory law, the 
business necessity doctrine provides no basis for recognizing this 
unrelated variation of the defense.78  Because the Court of Appeal 
misconstrued established case law, legislation, and legal principles, 
courts should not recognize the creative necessity defense as a 
legitimate legal defense to hostile work environment sexual 
harassment.79 
                                                          
conduct occurred during group meetings where both men and women were present 
and participated in sharing personal sexual experiences). 
 76. See id. at 292 (indirectly referencing the Court of Appeal’s creative necessity 
defense by agreeing with the Court of Appeal’s reasoning that the defendants could 
prove that their conduct was not harassment if it was within “'the scope of necessary 
job performance’ and not engaged in for purely personal gratification or out of 
meanness or bigotry or other personal motives”). The California Supreme Court 
stated, “[T]he circumstances pertaining to an employer’s type of work and to the job 
duties . . . of a plaintiff and her alleged harassers are properly considered in 
determining whether the harassers said or did things because of the plaintiff’s sex and 
whether the subject conduct altered the terms or conditions of employment.” Id. 
 77. See Brief for Legal Aid, supra note 63, at 44 (rebutting that there is a creative 
necessity defense to hostile work environment sexual harassment because a court’s 
consideration of the type of workplace is limited to a totality of the circumstances test 
pursuant to Harris and Oncale); see also Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 
563 (6th Cir. 1999) (characterizing the totality of the circumstances test as the most 
basic tenet of the hostile work environment cause of action). 
 78. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)-(B) (2006) (amending Title VII, 
Congress codified the concept of business necessity as enunciated in Griggs when it 
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991).  Congress, however, did not intend this 
affirmative defense for disparate treatment cases.  Id. at § 2000e-2(k)(2). 
 79. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998) 
14
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1. The Court of Appeal Misconstrued Disparate Impact and Disparate 
Treatment Discrimination 
The Court of Appeal’s inventive effort to announce a creative 
necessity defense analogous to the business necessity defense to 
disparate impact discrimination is legally unsound because it conflates 
two distinct theories of discrimination.80 The court failed to take into 
account that business necessity is an affirmative defense to a disparate 
impact claim and not sexual harassment, a form of disparate 
treatment.81  Therefore, a creative necessity defense based on the 
business necessity exception to disparate impact claims should not be 
applied to Lyle’s sexual harassment case because she asserts a 
disparate treatment claim that challenges the conditions of her 
employment.82 
Under the theoretical framework of disparate treatment, the 
defense of business necessity may not be used against a plaintiff who 
seeks to assert a claim of sexual harassment.83  Thus, the defendants 
could not permissibly raise a defense premised on business necessity 
to answer a claim of hostile work environment sexual harassment, a 
                                                          
(emphasizing that proper analysis of a hostile work environment requires careful 
consideration of the social context in which the behavior occurs because the real 
impact of such conduct depends on various surrounding circumstances).  Oncale’s 
social context standard does not provide for a creative necessity defense because a 
trier of fact could already determine if the writers’ behavior fell within the scope of 
necessary job performance under the totality of the circumstances test.  Id. 
 80. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329, 332-33 (1977) (illustrating that 
the Supreme Court has not applied the business necessity defense to a disparate 
treatment situation, even when both theories of discrimination were at issue); see also 
Timmons, supra note 47, at 1194 (discussing that courts do not think of disparate 
impact and harassment law as complementary because harassment is discriminatory). 
 81. See Mary Crossley, Reasonable Accommodation as Part and Parcel of the 
Antidiscrimination Project, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 861, 932 (2004) (explaining that a 
disparate impact case is distinct from a hostile work environment harassment case 
because not every employment practice that causes a disparate impact on women and 
minorities creates a working environment imbued with discrimination against 
members of those protected groups). Additionally, employers charged with disparate 
impact discrimination under Title VII may avoid liability by proving that the practice 
that creates the disparate impact is justified by business necessity, a defense not 
available to employers that have created or maintained a hostile work environment.  
Id. 
 82. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971) (establishing 
that Title VII extends to facially neutral employment practices, such as employment 
tests, having a disparate impact).  The Supreme Court did not define business 
necessity as a broad affirmative defense that applies to employment practices 
unrelated to job qualifications.  Id. at 431-32, 434.  See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(2) 
(providing that an employment practice justified by business necessity is not a defense 
against a claim of disparate treatment). 
 83. See L. Camille Hébert, The Disparate Impact of Sexual Harassment: Does 
Motive Matter?, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 341, 365 (2005) (clarifying that Johnson Controls 
stands for the proposition that disparate impact analysis, particularly disparate impact 
defenses, cannot be exercised against a plaintiff who asserted a claim of disparate 
treatment). 
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form of disparate treatment.84 
Admittedly, the Court of Appeal could argue that the Supreme 
Court and Congress did not foreclose the possibility of raising a 
disparate impact defense against a hostile work environment sexual 
harassment claim because the definition of job relatedness does not 
specifically outline the type of employment practices the defense 
covers.85  However, the judicial and legislative branches did not 
define job relatedness, the threshold requirement of business 
necessity, in terms of such practices because harassing conduct cannot 
be presumed to be facially neutral.86  Rather, they created and 
codified the business necessity defense to apply to an employer’s 
qualification standards or selection practices for hiring and 
promotion.87  Accordingly, a disparate impact analysis is 
inappropriate for Lyle’s claim because she is not challenging Warner 
Brothers’ qualification standards, selection process for hiring or 
promotion, or termination decisions.88  To the contrary, Lyle asserted 
that the writers subjected her to racial and sexual harassment through 
offensive comments and bigoted jokes.89 
Because Lyle never alleged a disparate impact discrimination claim 
against the defendants, it is irrelevant that the writers argue that their 
conduct was necessary for producing “Friends.”90  Their practice of 
                                                          
 84. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e(k)(2) (codifying that the business necessity defense is 
not available against a claim of intentional discrimination). 
 85. See Hébert, supra note 83, at 345 (postulating that the disparate impact 
theory might appropriately be used to challenge sexually harassing behavior in cases 
where the absence of intent to discriminate or the absence of different treatment of 
men and women is a barrier to the applicability of the disparate treatment theory).  
But see Rebecca Hanner White, There’s Nothing Special About Sex: The Supreme 
Court Mainstreams Sexual Harassment, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 725, 738-39 (1999) 
(arguing that the impact approach to sexual harassment claims is incorrect because 
sexual harassment is intentional discrimination). 
 86. See Steven Wellborn, Taking Discrimination Seriously: Oncale and the Fare 
of Exceptionalism in Sexual Harassment Law, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 677, n.45 
(contending that sexual harassment cases fail to satisfy the disparate impact model 
because the conduct is not sex-neutral). 
 87. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 443 (1982) (discussing the 
requirement that employees must pass a written examination for promotion 
consideration); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 327 (1977) (discussing the 
requirement that job applicants meet a certain height and weight); see also Timmons, 
supra note 47, at 1195 (arguing that the Supreme Court intended to extend the 
business necessity defense only to employment practices that are not caused by the 
sex of any person in the workplace). 
 88. See Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prod., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 511, 515 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2004), cert. granted, 94 P.3d 476 (Cal. 2004) (No. S125271) (alleging hostile 
work environment harassment based on the fact that Lyle personally witnessed the 
writers’ gender denigrating conduct during the meetings she had a duty to attend). 
 89. See id. (arguing that because Lyle was often the only female writers’ assistant 
in the writers’ room, she could not overlook or ignore the defendants’ offensive 
comments and behavior). 
 90. See Int’l Union United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of 
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sharing blow job stories, talking out rape fantasies, and drawing 
enlarged genitalia in pornographic coloring books does not manifest 
a relationship to Lyle’s qualifications for employment because, as the 
defendants admitted at trial, the practices at issue relate to their jobs 
as scriptwriters.91  If Warner Brothers followed the Court of Appeal’s 
business necessity analogy and asserted the creative necessity defense, 
the defendants would have to demonstrate that publicly discussing 
personal sexual exploits relates to and/or measures Lyle’s typing 
abilities and other skills necessary for her successful job 
performance.92  Such an application of this variation on the business 
necessity defense illuminates the inappropriateness of the Court of 
Appeal’s analogy.93 
The discrimination Lyle challenges does not involve pass/fail or 
qualified/unqualified barriers to tangible job benefits; rather, it 
involves workplace conduct that evinced hostility toward women and 
minorities and affected the conditions of her employment.94  
Furthermore, Lyle’s choice to base her sexual harassment claim in the 
disparate treatment theoretical framework is appropriate because the 
writers’ conduct was likely based on stereotypical notions that women 
exist for the sexual pleasure of men and/or they wanted to make the 
                                                          
America v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199 (1991) (stating that whether an 
employment practice involves disparate treatment does not depend on why the 
employer discriminates, but rather on the explicit terms of the discrimination); see 
also Wellborn, supra note 86, at n.45 (suggesting that the disparate impact model is 
inappropriate for sexual harassment cases). 
 91. Compare Lyle, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 513 (maintaining that the offensive and 
bigoted comments and jokes were an indispensable means of developing gags, 
dialogue, and story lines for “Friends”), with McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 
U.S. 792, 796 (1973) (refusing to rehire an employee who engaged in illegal activity 
against the employer), and Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216, 219 (10th 
Cir. 1972) (requiring airline pilot applicants to have a certain amount of previous 
flying experience).  Creative necessity cannot be analogized to the business necessity 
defense because the writers’ behavior is wholly unlike these miscellaneous 
employment practices that courts justified as business necessity. 
 92. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (explaining that 
a practice, which is a business necessity, must be predictive of or significantly 
correlated with the elements of the work that comprises the job for which the 
candidate is being evaluated). 
 93. See Wellborn, supra note 86, at n.45 (arguing that the disparate impact 
model is ill-suited for harassment cases because the conduct being challenged is 
generally not sex neutral and it would be too difficult to demonstrate how women are 
disproportionately affected by harassing conduct). 
 94. See Timmons, supra note 47, at 1180 (contending that pornography, 
discussions of sex, and other sexual conduct such as sex-related jokes can constitute 
disparate treatment of women when the conduct is motivated by a sexual desire for 
the plaintiff, when the conduct is directed only at women, or when the conduct is 
intended to intimidate or affect women); see also Gertrud M. Fremling & Richard A. 
Posner, Status Signaling and the Law, With a Particular Application to Sexual 
Harassment, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1069, 1085 (1999) (stating the men flaunt symbols of 
male sexuality by using obscene language, exhibiting their genitalia, and posting 
pornographic pictures when they want to drive women out of the workplace). 
17
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workplace uncomfortable for Lyle and other female employees.95  
The writers’ sexual comments, jokes, and epithets expressed gender 
hostility.96  Similarly, their choice to display pornographic images 
depicting cheerleaders with their legs spread apart while in Lyle’s 
presence conveyed the message that they see women as sex objects.97  
Because the writers’ employment practice is distinct from aptitude 
tests, education requirements, and previous experience qualifications, 
the Court of Appeal’s analogy between business necessity and creative 
necessity is an unwarranted leap of logic and, therefore, should not be 
recognized.98 
2. The Court of Appeal Misconstrued Case Law When Analogizing 
Creative Necessity to Business Necessity 
a. The Court of Appeal Erred When Misapplying the Supreme 
Court’s Oncale Standard 
The Court of Appeal correctly stated that the workplace context is 
one of the many factors a trier of fact analyzes in a sexual harassment 
claim; however, this single factor cannot justify a separate defense that 
the defendants may assert to avoid liability under Title VII or FEHA.99  
Pursuant to Oncale, evidence about the specific workplace context in 
a sexual harassment case is properly considered as part of the totality 
of the circumstances test, but it is not a defense to a hostile work 
environment.100  This Supreme Court precedent contemplates what 
                                                          
 95. See DeClue v. Cent. Ill. Light Co., 223 F.3d 434, 437 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating 
that sexual harassment consists of efforts by coworkers or supervisors to make the 
workplace intolerable or at least severely and discriminatorily uncongenial for 
women); see also Dorothy Roberts, The Collective Injury to Sexual Harassment, in 
DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 365, 367 (Catherine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. 
Siegel eds., 2004) (noting that males exhibit sexual conduct in the workplace to 
protect “male” jobs from intrusion by women or to insure that women incorporate 
into the workplace on inferior terms). 
 96. See, e.g., Funk v. F & K Supply, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 205, 216 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) 
(finding that the defendant’s use of vulgarities, such as “stupid cunt,” “dickbreath,” 
and “asshole” constituted sex-based harassment). 
 97. See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1523 
(M.D. Fla. 1991) (finding that the display of nude female pictures conveys the 
message that women do not belong in the workplace). 
 98. See Brief for Legal Aid, supra note 63, at 43 (arguing that the creative 
necessity defense is impermissible because it is not rooted in the disparate treatment 
theory). 
 99. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998) 
(providing nothing to suggest that a creative necessity defense can be justified by the 
instruction to consider the totality of the circumstances). 
 100. See id. (stating that proper analysis of a hostile work environment requires 
careful consideration of the social context in which the behavior occurs because the 
real impact of such conduct depends on the surrounding circumstances, but offering 
nothing else); Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529, 535 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that 
Oncale instructs that the severity of the alleged harassment be assessed in light of the 
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activity is within the scope of necessary job performance, thus proper 
application of the Oncale social context standard would render the 
creative necessity defense superfluous.101  Because the Court of 
Appeal misread and misapplied the Oncale social context standard, its 
creative necessity defense cannot stand.102 
The Supreme Court unanimously held that sexual harassment must 
constitute discrimination within the meaning of Title VII; that is, a 
plaintiff in a hostile work environment case must plead and ultimately 
prove the statutory requirement that discrimination arose because of 
sex.103  By rejecting the idea that sexual conduct is a substitute for 
Title VII’s “because of sex” requirement,104 the Court ensured that no 
special defense was necessary to protect creative employers’ legitimate 
business interests because a plaintiff must still establish that her 
environment is both objectively and subjectively hostile.105  If Lyle 
cannot prove that the nature of her work environment, however 
unpleasant, resulted because of her sex, she is not a victim of hostile 
work environment sexual harassment.106  Thus, a trier of fact could 
not hold the defendants liable simply because their harassing 
behavior is offensive or insensitive.107 
The Oncale Court further emphasized that when the trier of fact 
analyzes the objective severity of harassment, it should consider the 
                                                          
workplace’s social context, but never suggesting that the prevailing culture of the 
workplace can excuse discriminatory conduct). 
 101. See Michael J. Frank, The Social Context Variable in Hostile Environment 
Litigation, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 437, 438 (2002) (arguing that Oncale endorses 
that courts examine the record to determine whether vulgar language and unpleasant 
conduct is a normal part of the workplace and, therefore, the standard already takes 
into account whether communications are actually necessary to the business or 
enterprise). 
 102. See Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 564 (6th Cir. 1999) 
(emphasizing that a court cannot point to the nature of the workplace alone to 
excuse hostile work environment harassment because it should look at the totality of 
the circumstances). 
 103. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79-80 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006)) 
(affirming that Title VII is only directed at discrimination because of sex). 
 104. See id. at 80 (reiterating that Title VII does not prohibit all verbal and 
physical harassment and that the Court has never recognized that harassment is 
automatically discrimination because of sex merely because the words used have 
sexual content or connotations). 
 105. See id. at 81 (stating that conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to 
create an objectively hostile work environment is beyond Title VII’s purview). 
 106. See id. at 80 (establishing that a plaintiff must demonstrate that she suffered 
disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment because of her sex to successfully 
prove her claim of sexual harassment). 
 107. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (declaring that not all 
workplace conduct, such as an offensive utterance, constitutes actionable 
harassment); see also Frank, supra note 101, at 468 (explaining that liability only 
arises when there is a causal nexus between the harassment and the employee’s 
protected attribute of sex). 
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totality of the circumstances while paying careful attention to the 
social context in which the alleged harassment occurs and is 
experienced by the plaintiff.108  This directive suggests that different 
workplace environments alter how the plaintiff interprets and receives 
allegedly harassing words and conduct.109  Accordingly, an 
examination of a hostile work environment claim in light of the social 
context standard allows a reasonable trier of fact to determine if the 
“Friends” writers’ conduct related to their job of producing an adult-
oriented sitcom.110  The Court of Appeal’s creative necessity defense 
is unnecessary because consideration of the social mores of the 
television writers’ room allows the trier of fact to determine whether: 
(1) the writers’ words and conduct were truly harassment or nothing 
more than office banter;111 (2) the writers’ words and conduct were 
unwelcome or just accepted as unpleasant sophomoric behavior;112 
and (3) the writers’ speech and conduct were designed to harm Lyle 
because of her sex or instead served the legitimate business purpose 
of producing a sitcom.113 
Because the social context standard allows for the writers’ sexual 
speech and expressive conduct, as long as it is not objectively and 
subjectively hostile, the defendants do not need the Court of Appeal’s 
creative necessity defense to convince a jury that the nature of writing 
for a television comedy necessitates talking about blow jobs, anal sex, 
and rape.114  Therefore, the Court of Appeal’s creative necessity 
defense does not comport with Oncale. 
 
                                                          
 108. See Frank, supra note 101, at 466 (stating that courts have reasoned that 
certain blue-collar work environments and their traditionally unrefined atmosphere 
are relevant to evaluating the “because of sex” requirement in a hostile work 
environment analysis). 
 109. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82 (explaining that the real social impact of 
workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances 
that is not captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts 
performed). 
 110. See id. (commenting that an appropriate sensitivity to social context and 
common sense will enable courts and juries to distinguish between simple teasing or 
roughhousing and conduct that a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would 
find severely hostile or abusive). 
 111. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 747 (1978) (recognizing that words 
that are commonplace in one setting are shocking in another). 
 112. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-04 (11th Cir. 1982) 
(requiring that the plaintiff must show that the harassing conduct was unwelcome to 
prove a claim of sexual harassment). 
 113. See Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529, 535 (7th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that the 
Oncale standard allows judges and juries to make the threshold determination 
whether certain forms of behavior in a given workplace are discriminatory or not). 
 114. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82 (ensuring that the trier of fact can use common 
sense to distinguish horseplay, flirtation, and the like from harassment). 
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b. The Court of Appeal Misread the Supreme Court of 
California’s Reno v. Baird 
The Court of Appeal also misconstrued state case law when 
gathering support for its creative necessity defense.115  In Reno v. 
Baird, the Supreme Court of California did not seek to define the 
parameters of unlawful harassing conduct under FEHA.116 Rather, 
the court explained the differences between harassment and 
discrimination and why the distinction mattered for supervisor 
liability.117  The Supreme Court of California concluded that 
supervisor liability could only be predicated on harassment because 
the nature of “harassment consists of a type of conduct not necessary 
for performance of a supervisory job,” as opposed to discrimination 
that arises out of employment practices necessary for personnel 
management.118  Reno does not stand for the proposition that 
Warner Brothers can escape liability for sexual harassment if they can 
prove that the writers’ choice of words or conduct was necessary for 
creating a comedic sitcom.119 
Oncale and Reno cannot be read to suggest that Warner Brothers 
may answer Lyle’s claim of sexual harassment with a creative necessity 
defense, which would allow the writers to avoid liability if their 
conduct was necessary for the performance of producing “Friends.”  
Because the Court of Appeal’s creative necessity defense is premised 
on a misreading and misapplication of the business necessity 
exception to disparate impact discrimination, the Oncale standard, 
and the Reno definition of harassment, it is an impermissible legal 
standard.120  The issue is not and should not be whether the writers’ 
behavior was job related, but rather, when considering the totality of 
                                                          
 115. See Brief for the Employers Group et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 11, Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prod., 94 P.3d 476 (Cal. 2004) 
(No. S125271), 2005 WL 847603 (arguing that the Court of Appeal’s reasoning based 
on Reno was misplaced because the Reno court did not address how the context of 
alleged wrongful speech or expressive conduct may bear upon an harassment claim). 
 116. See 957 P.2d 1333, 1334 (Cal. 1998) (deciding whether persons claiming 
discrimination may sue their supervisors individually and hold them liable for 
damages). 
 117. See id. at 1336 (distinguishing between harassment as a type of conduct not 
necessary to a supervisor’s job performance and business decisions that might later be 
considered discriminatory but are necessary to the supervisor’s performance). 
 118. See id. (proffering that employment-related decisions cannot constitute 
actionable harassment because personnel decisions are fundamentally different from 
conduct that is avoidable and unnecessary). 
 119. See id. (finding that necessary personnel actions such as hiring or firing, work 
station assignments, promotion or demotion, performance evaluations, deciding who 
will attend meetings, and the like do not come within the meaning of harassment). 
 120. See White, supra note 85, at 739 (arguing that Oncale precludes employers 
from framing claims under a disparate impact theory in sexual harassment cases). 
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the circumstances, whether their behavior created a hostile work 
environment.121 
B. The Lyle Decision Undermines the Purpose of Title VII and FEHA 
Because it Narrows the Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment 
Doctrine 
In Lyle, the Court of Appeal’s surprising decision to recognize a 
creative necessity defense ignores the legislative intent underlying 
Title VII and FEHA.122  While the federal and state civil rights laws 
aim to cure employment discrimination on the basis of sex, the 
creative necessity defense narrows the hostile work environment 
sexual harassment doctrine because it could allow defendants to 
disguise discriminatory conduct in an indefinite number of “creative” 
workplaces.123 
It is understandable that the court found merit in the defendants’ 
argument that sexually explicit discussion is a necessary element of 
creating the adult-oriented sitcom “Friends,” but the court 
misconceived the nature of its role when it recognized the creative 
necessity defense.124  The legislatures established a framework for 
courts to evaluate hostile work environment sexual harassment claims 
under Title VII and FEHA;125 however, the framework does not give 
                                                          
 121. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) 
(announcing that the critical issue is whether, when considering all the 
circumstances, the employers or coworkers exposed the plaintiff to disadvantageous 
terms and conditions of employment that members of the opposite sex did not 
suffer). 
 122. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (confirming that 
Congress’ objective in enacting Title VII was to achieve equal employment 
opportunities by removing barriers that operate in favor of an identifiable group over 
the other employees); see also CAL. GOV’T CODE. § 12920 (West 2005) (declaring that 
it is necessary to safeguard against the practice of denying employment opportunities 
or discriminating in the terms of employment because it causes domestic strife, 
deprives the state of the fullest utilization of its capacities for development and 
advancement, and adversely affects the interests of employees, employers, and the 
general public). 
 123. Cf. Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 564 (6th Cir. 1999) 
(asserting that a woman who chooses to work in a male-dominated trade does not 
relinquish her right to be free from sexual harassment).  The court found it illogical 
that the lower court would excuse harassing conduct because it took place in a blue 
collar environment and argued that such reasoning means that the more hostile the 
environment and the more prevalent the sexism, the more difficult it is for a Title VII 
plaintiff to prove that sex-based conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute 
actionable harassment. Id. 
 124. See id. (claiming that courts cannot point to long-standing or traditional 
hostility toward women to excuse hostile work environment harassment, even when 
considering the nature of the workplace). 
 125. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2 (2006) (requiring courts to find that the harassing 
conduct was based on sex and was severe or pervasive enough to alter the employee’s 
working conditions); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940(j)(1) (West 2005) (mandating that 
the trier of fact find that an employer or supervisor harassed the employee because of 
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the Court of Appeal discretion to insulate harassing conduct from the 
reach of these civil rights statutes simply because it took place in the 
context of a creative environment.126  By announcing the creative 
necessity defense, the Court of Appeal departed from the legislative 
intent of promoting and enforcing workplace equality.127 
1. The Court of Appeal’s Creative Necessity Defense Ignores Federal 
and State Legislative Intent 
a. The Court of Appeal Must Interpret Title VII and FEHA in 
Accordance with Legislative Intent 
When considering statutory issues, the Court of Appeal must 
ascertain the intent of the legislature to carry out the purpose of the 
anti-discrimination laws.128  To act in conformity with legislative 
intent, the court was required to remedy any sexual harassment 
during the production of “Friends,” advance the purpose of 
workplace equality, and avoid judicial interpretations or inventions 
that allow for the continuance of discriminatory conduct.129  The 
legislative intent should have governed the decision in this case; 
however, the Court of Appeal ignored this standard of judgment 
when formulating the creative necessity defense,130 a judicial 
invention that fails to remedy sexual harassment because it could 
                                                          
sex). 
 126. See Williams, 187 F.3d at 564 (rejecting the view that the standard for sexual 
harassment varies depending on the work environment); Alex Chun, Hostile La Vista, 
Baby. Hollywood Lawyer’s Delicate Task: Making Harassment Claims Go Away, L.A. 
DAILY J., Sept. 27, 1997, available at http://www.rmslaw.com/in_the_media/art1.htm 
(stating that it is not a defense to sexual harassment for entertainment employers to 
claim that sexual joking is prevalent in the industry, and, thus, that the plaintiff knew 
what she was getting into). 
 127. See Christopher W. Deering, Same-Gender Sexual Harassment: A Need to Re-
Examine the Legal Underpinnings of Title VII’s Ban on Discrimination “Because Of” 
Sex, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 231, 270 (1996-97) (arguing that a court’s reliance on a narrow 
application of Title VII inappropriately trammels the statute because it ignores the 
Congressional intent to construe the statue broadly and, thus, fails to eliminate the 
unfairness and humiliation of harassment). 
 128. See Day v. City of Fontana, 25 Cal. 4th 268, 272 (2001) (insisting that courts 
have the fundamental task of ascertaining the intent of the lawmakers to effectuate 
the purpose of the statute); see also SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45:5 
(Norman J. Singer ed., 6th ed. 2005) (explaining that the separation of powers 
principle mandates that the judiciary construe statutes so that they carry out the will 
of the lawmakers). 
 129. See SUTHERLAND, supra note 128, § 45:5 (expressing a classic formulation of 
statutory interpretation that requires judges to consider: (1) the common law before 
passing the act; (2) the evil that the common law did not cure; (3) the remedy the 
legislative body appointed to cure the evil; and (4) the true reason for the remedy). 
 130. See Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prod., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 511 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2004), cert. granted, 94 P.3d 476 (Cal. 2004) (No. S125271) (overlooking legislative 
intent by failing to cite any principle of statutory construction or consulting the policy 
goals of the federal or state legislatures to justify the defense it proposes). 
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allow the defendants to avoid liability and damages under Title VII 
and FEHA.131  Had the court followed the standard of statutory 
interpretation, which includes consulting the legislative history, the 
language of the statute, and the policy behind the anti-discrimination 
laws,132 it would have recognized that creative necessity cannot serve 
as a legitimate legal defense to hostile work environment sexual 
harassment because it undermines the federal and state legislatures’ 
expressed intent of removing arbitrary barriers to sexual equality in 
the workplace.133 
b. Title VII and FEHA Do Not Support the Creative Necessity 
Defense 
The text of Title VII and FEHA does not support the Court of 
Appeal’s creative necessity defense.  The statutory text is the starting 
point for assessing Lyle’s cause of action, which is rooted in Title VII 
and FEHA’s prohibitions.134  On their face, the statutes do not 
instruct courts to consider the context of Warner Brothers’ workplace 
as a defense to hostile work environment sexual harassment.135  
Although Title VII and FEHA regulate discrimination on the different 
bases of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin, the statutes 
apply the same prohibitions to all forms of discriminatory conduct 
regardless of whether it takes place in a blue-collar shipyard, a law 
firm, or a television writers’ room.136  This suggests that no special 
                                                          
 131. See White, supra note 85, at 739 (discussing that a disparate impact-based 
legal principle would prevent a hostile work environment sexual harassment plaintiff 
from recovering damages because she suffered no out-of-pocket loss and, therefore, it 
would conflict with Congress’ intent to provide remedies as a means for deterring 
intentional discrimination). 
 132. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 859, 
862, 866 (1984) (enunciating standards for the judicial interpretation of statutes and 
looking to statutory language, legislative history, and policy). 
 133. See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyard, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1523 (M.D. 
Fla. 1991) (describing employees’ conduct of displaying pornographic images and 
using derogatory, sexist language as actionable behavior that creates a barrier to the 
progress of women in the workplace because it communicates that they do not 
belong and that they must subvert their identities to the sexual stereotypes that 
permeate that environment). 
 134. See Greyhound Corp. v. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 437 U.S. 322, 330 (1978) 
(affirming that logic and precedent dictate that the starting point of every case 
involving statutory analysis begins with the text). 
 135. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2005) (articulating the burden of proof for disparate 
impact cases, but nowhere promulgating factors to consider when deciding a 
disparate treatment sexual harassment case); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12490(a) (West 
2005) (delineating no factors for consideration in a hostile work environment case). 
 136. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (making it unlawful to discriminate on the basis 
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12490(a) 
(proscribing employment practices that discriminate against an applicant or 
employee because of race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, disability, marital 
status, sex, age, or sexual orientation). 
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exemption exists for creative workplaces within the framework of 
these anti-discrimination laws.137  Their text recognizes one general 
standard for different types of hostile work environments;138 thus, the 
creative necessity defense is inconsistent with federal and state 
legislative intent because it fails to treat employers and employees in 
different industries similarly under the law.139 
The Court of Appeal could argue that its function is to fill gaps in 
the anti-discrimination laws and remedy legislative oversights.140  This 
argument has merit, especially when considering that the federal 
judiciary created the hostile work environment doctrine in light of the 
fact that Title VII did not expressly mention or define harassment.141  
However, a close examination of the Title VII and FEHA’s language 
reveals that the legislatures did not intend to limit or narrow the 
reach of the statutes and contemplated that the writers’ sex-related 
behavior could constitute actionable harassment.142  Instead of 
correcting a defect in Title VII, the Court of Appeal’s creative 
necessity defense will not only insulate discriminatory behavior, but 
also cause problems for courts and litigants.143 
i. The Creative Necessity Defense Ignores Title VII’s Statutory 
Language 
The key to enforcing sexual harassment law is to ascertain and 
effectuate legislative intent, which courts primarily obtain from the 
                                                          
 137. See Frank, supra note 101, at 516 (stating that the same level of scrutiny 
should be applied to all sexual harassment claims across the board, regardless of 
whether the workplace is populated with “ruffians or royalty”). 
 138. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 n.1 (1998) 
(rationalizing that, although racial and sexual harassment take on different forms, it 
makes sense to harmonize the Title VII standards). 
 139. See, e.g., Conner v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int’l, Inc., 227 F.3d 179, 194 (4th 
Cir. 2000) (rejecting the view that the text of Title VII permits an exception for 
harassment that takes place in the context of strenuous work). 
 140. See N.W. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981) 
(recognizing that federal courts have given broad and ambiguous statutes concrete 
meaning through case-by-case judicial decisions in the common law tradition); see 
also Frank, supra note 101, at 519 (arguing that if courts are free to fill the gaps in the 
law, they are also free to create the standards and burdens of, as well as defenses to 
hostile work environment claims). 
 141. See Ford v. West, 222 F.3d 767, 775 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting that Title VII 
does not explicitly mention hostile work environment, nor use any terms to describe 
the conduct it includes). 
 142. See generally New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 348 (1931) (declaring 
that judicial common law is subject to the paramount authority of Congress).  The 
Court of Appeal cannot limit the scope of Title VII or FEHA because the lawmaking 
power is vested in the legislative, not the judicial branch of government. Id. 
 143. Cf. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1996) (reasoning that a law 
fails to be fair if it is so vague that it leaves the public uncertain as to what conduct is 
prohibited or leaves judges and juries, without any legally fixed standard, free to 
decide what is and is not prohibited). 
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plain meaning of Title VII’s language.144  The plain meaning rule 
assumes that the legislature intended the ordinary meaning of the 
statute.145  The plain language of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 forbids an employer from discriminating against any individual 
with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment because of such individual’s sex.146  The federal statute’s 
language, however, does not expressly define the phrase “terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment.”147  Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court decided that Congress’s choice not to specifically 
define what constitutes hostile work environment sexual harassment 
evinces its intent to “strike at the entire spectrum of disparate 
treatment of men and women in employment,”148 especially since 
courts must construe Title VII liberally.149  Because Title VII does not 
enumerate specific discriminatory practices or define the parameters 
of such harassing conduct, the broad statutory language reveals that 
Congress contemplated that television writers’ sexually coarse and 
vulgar speech could possibly create the hostile work environment 
harassment Title VII aims to eliminate.150  Consequently, the Court of 
Appeal was not free to read unwarranted meanings into Title VII,151 
                                                          
 144. See United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 604 (1986) (stating that courts look 
first to the language of the statute to determine the legislature’s intent). 
 145. See, e.g., State v. Young, 465 A.2d 1375, 1376 (Vt. 1983) (assuming that the 
plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language was intended by the 
legislature).  But see State ex rel. Miller v. Santa Rosa Sales, 475 N.W.2d 210, 218 
(Iowa 1991) (noting that legislative intent can be expressed by omission as well as by 
the inclusion of language). 
 146. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006) (condemning the disparate treatment of 
female employees). 
 147. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (failing to articulate what constitutes actionable 
harassment and not expressly defining unlawful conduct because Title VII was 
designed for courts to construe and apply the remedial statute liberally). 
 148. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (rejecting the view 
that Title VII’s language shows that Congress intended to limit the reach of the 
statute to economic barriers erected by discrimination). 
 149. See Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182, 197 (1990) (stating the Civil Rights 
Act was intended to protect, defend, and provide remedies for wrongs to all people 
and should be liberally and beneficently construed); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 
1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988) (stating that Congress intentionally drafted Title VII in the 
broadest possible terms so that it could reach all forms of harassment). 
 150. See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1972) (declaring that Title 
VII’s language evinces Congress’ intent to define discrimination in the broadest 
possible terms because it knew that constant change in the workforce would make 
seemingly reasonable practices of the present become the injustices of the future); 
see also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (extending 
Title VII to cover same-sex harassment illustrated that the statutory provisions go 
beyond the principle evil for which they were enacted to cover reasonably 
comparable evils). 
 151. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (recognizing the business necessity defense in 
disparate impact cases, but nowhere providing for the same defense to disparate 
treatment or an exception for unique workplaces); see also Eskanos & Adler, P.C. v. 
Leetien, 309 F.3d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 
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even to support the supposedly desirable policy of balancing the 
writers’ free speech rights, which is not a goal of the statute as 
written.152  Because the Court of Appeal’s creative necessity defense 
potentially carves out an exception for the writers’ sexual conduct, it 
undermines the intent of Congress because it could allow for the 
continuance of harassment in creative workplaces, the harm Title VII 
seeks to remedy.153 
ii. The Creative Necessity Defense Disregards FEHA’s Statutory 
Language 
Similarly, the plain language of FEHA reveals that the California 
legislature chose not to limit harassment to any particular kind of 
conduct because the state, like the federal government, intended to 
broadly extend its civil rights law as far as needed to remedy the 
sexual harassment that prevents workplace equality for women and 
minorities.154  Although FEHA also does not explicitly define 
harassment, California’s Fair Employment and Housing Commission 
extends the definition of harassment to epithets, derogatory 
comments or slurs, and derogatory posters, cartoons, or drawings.155  
This regulatory language further illuminates the state’s intent to 
eliminate sexually-themed speech and conduct that amounts to 
harassment in the workplace.156  Therefore, the language of FEHA 
                                                          
U.S. 337, 340 (1997)) (asserting that a court’s inquiry in analyzing a statute ceases if 
the plain meaning of the statute conveys congressional intent and the statutory 
scheme is coherent and consistent). 
 152. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (stating no reference to free speech issues in the 
workplace); see also Taravella v. Stanley, 727 A.2d 727, 731 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999) 
(stating that courts may not read provisions into clearly expressed legislation that are 
not expressed in its words). 
 153. See Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (citing Note, 
Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARV. 
L. REV. 1449, 1451-52 (1984)) (stating that Congress enacted Title VII to eradicate the 
imbalance of power and abuse that results in discrimination against a discrete and 
vulnerable group); see also Joanna Grossman, Are ‘Friends’ Writers ‘Required to 
Engage in Sexual Banter?, CNN, May 24, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/05 
/04/grossman.friends/ (arguing that the creative necessity defense will preserve the 
sexism in the entertainment industry). 
 154. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940(a) (West 2006) (prohibiting employers from 
discriminating in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment on the basis of an 
employee’s sex, but failing to define the term “harassment,” the phrase “because of,” 
or any particular type of conduct, thus, indicating broad construction). 
 155. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 7287.6 (2006) (recognizing that verbal and visual 
harassment can unreasonably interfere with an individual’s work performance and 
create a hostile environment). 
 156. See Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 262 Cal. Rptr. 842, 850 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1989) (approving the FEHC’s position that almost any type of conduct may 
constitute sexual harassment); see also Am. Newspaper Publishers Assn. v. Alexander, 
294 F. Supp. 1100, 1103 (D.D.C. 1968) (noting that civil rights legislation has 
delegated broad discretion to the administrative agencies, and the courts have paid 
substantial respect to the administrative interpretations of such laws). 
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reasonably covers the situation in the “Friends” writers’ room.  The 
defendants’ discussions of oral and anal sex, rape fantasies, and 
missed opportunities to “fuck” the actresses Courtney Cox and 
Jennifer Aniston, as well as their habits of viewing and depicting 
pornographic images, fall within the range of actionable conduct 
established by the FEHC because the regulatory language uses the 
word “includes,” signifying that the components of the statute can be 
enlarged.157  Consequently, the defendants’ sexually coarse and 
vulgar speech can constitute sexual harassment within the meaning of 
statute, even when such conduct serves the creative process.158  
Because the defendants could assert the creative necessity defense as a 
pretext to preserve workplace hostility or excuse their harassing 
conduct, the Court of Appeal’s decision conflicts with the purpose of 
FEHA.159 
iii. The Creative Necessity Defense Undermines the Statutory 
Scheme of FEHA as a Whole 
Although courts first examine the plain language of a statute to 
discern legislative intent, the Supreme Court recognized that statutory 
language considered in isolation from the context of the whole Act 
may not accurately convey legislative intent.160  Accordingly, a court 
must construe FEHA so all parts of the statutory scheme operate in 
harmony and further the intent of the California legislature.161  
Therefore, it was improper for the Court of Appeal to rest its decision 
in Lyle primarily on Section 12940 of FEHA.162 
                                                          
 157. See Brown v. Scott Paper Worldwide Co., 20 P.3d 921, 926 (Wash. 2001) 
(stating that use of the word “includes” means courts can extend the scope of the 
statute); see also Fisher, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 850 (noting that FEHC’s non-exhaustive list 
of actionable harassment, as an administrative interpretation of the statute, should be 
accorded great respect by the courts and followed if not clearly erroneous). 
 158. See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (reading Title VII’s 
broad-gauged language as proscribing conduct that destroys the emotional and 
psychological stability of women and minorities). 
 159. See Grossman, supra note 153 (suggesting that the Court of Appeal’s logic 
means that if indelicate forms of expression are accepted and endured as normal 
human behavior by many males and some women, then other women cannot sue). 
 160. See King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991) (stating that courts 
must follow the cardinal rule that a statute is to be read as a whole since the meaning 
of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context). 
 161. See Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 631-32 
(1973) (stating that it is the Court’s task in interpreting separate provisions of an Act 
to give the statute the most harmonious meaning possible in light of the legislative 
policy and purpose); Dyna-Med v. FEHC, 743 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Cal. 1987) 
(emphasizing that statutes must be construed in context with the statutory purpose 
and must be harmonized with the statutory sections relating to the same subject). 
 162. See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962) (declaring that it is the 
Court’s responsibility to look to the provisions of the whole law and to its object and 
policy when considering statutory issues). 
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Rather, the court should have considered this hostile work 
environment sexual harassment case in light of the related FEHA 
provisions and legislative history, which make clear that it is the State’s 
public policy to safeguard Lyle’s civil right to seek, obtain, and hold 
employment without discrimination on the basis of her sex.163  
Although the Court of Appeal recognized that creative necessity only 
operates as a limited defense to hostile work environment sexual 
harassment, it failed to fulfill its judicial duty of applying FEHA in 
accordance with its legislative intent.  The defense is inconsistent with 
the State’s policy of ensuring the development and advancement of a 
diverse workforce because it insulates a category of otherwise 
actionable conduct, creating a barrier to Lyle’s promotion in the field 
of sitcom writing and conveying the message that women are not 
welcome in Hollywood unless they tolerate sexual stereotypes.164  The 
creative necessity defense permits the writers to engage in conduct 
that would otherwise be discriminatory in different work settings;165 
thus, it goes against the intent of the legislature since it frustrates the 
goals of anti-discrimination law by allowing environments that have 
traditionally been dominated by men and hostile to women to remain 
that way.166 
 
2. The Vague and Overbroad Framework of the Creative Necessity 
Defense Contravenes the Purpose of Title VII and FEHA 
 
The vague and overly broad creative necessity defense167 is 
inconsistent with the federal and state policy of prohibiting 
employment discrimination on the basis of any protected 
                                                          
 163. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12920 (West 2005) (declaring it public policy to 
protect an individual’s right to nondiscriminatory employment); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 
12921 (West 2005) (asserting that it is an employee’s “civil right” to seek, obtain, and 
hold employment without suffering discrimination). 
 164. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12920 (expressing that FEHA’s purpose is to provide 
effective remedies that will eliminate the cause and effect of discriminatory practices). 
 165. See Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prod., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 511, 520 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2004), cert. granted, 94 P.3d 476 (Cal. 2004) (No. S125271) (stating that the 
defendants may convince the jury that the artistic process for producing episodes of 
“Friends” necessitates conduct that might be unacceptable in other contexts). 
 166. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1990) (contending that 
harassers should not be able to continue to harass merely because a particular 
discriminatory practice is commonplace because it leaves victims with no remedy); 
Grossman, supra note 153 (contending that traditionally male work environments 
cannot be exempted from contemporary standards of equality, especially since it is 
these environments in which such standards must be rigorously enforced). 
 167. See Frank, supra note 101, at 491 (commenting that courts have failed to 
discover guiding principles that effectively distinguish between unpleasant banter and 
full-blown harassment when applying judicial inventions). 
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classification.168  The court’s approach potentially creates an 
exemption for creative workplaces and conduct that is normally 
viewed as discriminatory in other settings, allowing for employers and 
employees to engage in discriminatory sexual (or racial, religious, 
ageist) speech without fear of reprisal169 and reducing protection for 
many victims.170  When formulating this defense, the Court of Appeal 
failed to outline what constitutes a creative workplace.171  Is the 
defense strictly limited to television production, or can employers in 
academia, advertising, film production, magazines, theater 
production, publishing, or even automobile design assert it against a 
claim of sexual harassment?172  The Court of Appeal did not create a 
principle whereby a judge or jury could differentiate between various 
cases and creative contexts.173 
The defense, as articulated by the Court of Appeal, is so broad that 
many types of conduct, which are clearly within the federal and state 
governments’ power to prohibit under Title VII and FHEA, will be 
allowed, such as vulgar speech and conduct continually directed at 
                                                          
 168. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (mandating that 
employment practices that are neutral on their face or in their intent cannot be 
maintained if they operate to freeze the status quo of prior discrimination); see also 
Grossman, supra note 153 (arguing that applying a more lenient standard for sexual 
harassment to comedy writers could mean that women will continue to feel like 
outsiders in the environment of the entertainment industry). 
 169. See Brief for Legal Aid, supra note 63, at 44 (arguing that the creative 
necessity defense would create a blanket exemption for any industry that deems itself 
“creative,” permitting any type of words or conduct in the workplace that leads to the 
final product). 
 170. See Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 662 (6th Cir. 1999) (contending 
that special consideration for certain workplaces lowers the hostile work environment 
standard, making it more difficult for victims to have a successful sexual harassment 
claim). 
 171. See Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prod., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 511, 520 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2004), cert. granted, 94 P.3d 476 (Cal. 2004) (No. S125271) (offering no 
clarification as to what constitutes a creative workplace other than a reiteration of the 
state supreme court’s definition of harassment to support the creative necessity 
defense). 
 172. See Daniel E. Eaton, Writers Gone Wild: “The Muse Made Me Do It” As a 
Defense to a Claim of Sexual Harassment, 12 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 1, n.54 (2004) 
(arguing that restricting creative necessity to the arts ignores the inherently creative 
nature of many occupations not generally considered creative, but that require the 
same kind of creative freedom indispensable to the arts); Brief for Alliance of Motion 
Picture and Television Producers et al. in Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 
24, Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prod., 94 P.3d 476 (Cal. 2004) (No. S125271), 
2005 WL 847606 [hereinafter Brief for Alliance] (asking if a museum guard can sue 
for harassment if she had to look at an exhibit featuring Playboy centerfolds and 
listen to stupid, sexist, and lewd comments from patrons). 
 173. See Breda v. Wolf Camera, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1377 (S.D. Ga. 2001) 
(insisting that the current case law makes it more difficult to determine the severity 
and quantity of gesturing, touching, and banter necessary to create a hostile work 
environment than “nailing a jellyfish to the wall”). 
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women generally.174  Although the Court of Appeal explained that 
the creative necessity defense has limits, it failed to specify a standard 
of permissible conduct.175  The Court explained that a trier of fact 
could find that the writers’ sexually explicit conduct fell within the 
scope of necessary job performance if they did not engage in such 
behavior for purely personal gratification or other personal 
motives.176  But it failed to define the line where sexually explicit 
conduct would no longer be deemed work related, and rather would 
be viewed as personally gratifying. 177  Consequently, it is unclear how 
a trier of fact will meaningfully determine if writing an episode of 
“Friends” necessitated the writers’ sexual speech and conduct.178 
Moreover, the Court of Appeal’s failure to specify permissible 
conduct in the context of a creative work environment poses an unfair 
burden on Warner Brothers and the writers to prove that their 
sexually-themed speech was necessary to their job performance.179  
When an employer or employee cannot predict how a trier of fact will 
apply or evaluate the creative necessity defense in recurring factual 
situations, they cannot know the scope of legal protection afforded to 
them.180  The vagueness of the creative necessity defense makes it 
impossible for a supervisor or employer to know in advance whether 
their conduct is illegal, which could lead to two extreme 
consequences.  On one hand, the creative necessity defense could 
                                                          
 174. See Grossman, supra note 153 (recognizing that if the creative necessity 
defense is too broad, sexual harassment cases may be unsuccessful, despite the reality 
of the discrimination it is seeking to correct). 
 175. See Lyle, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 520 (admitting that the creative necessity defense 
had limits by stating that writers could not kiss, fondle, or caress assistants for the 
purpose of developing a love scene, nor could they make lewd, offensive, or 
demeaning remarks personally directed at assistants). 
 176. See id. (relying, albeit improperly, on the Reno definition of harassment that 
explains that harassment is not conduct that is necessary for management of the 
employer’s business). 
 177. See id. (providing no guidance for applying or evaluating the creative 
necessity defense other than stating that the defendants cannot engage in such 
conduct for meanness or bigotry). 
 178. See Grossman, supra note 153 (illustrating that a judge or jury could view the 
episode of “Friends” in which the character Rachel seduces a coworker by dressing up 
as a cheerleader as arising out of the many lewd drawings of naked cheerleaders and 
the writers’ personal fantasies, or they could determine that the construction of the 
episode did not necessitate the writers’ sexual conduct). 
 179. See Eaton, supra note 172, at 1, 7 (2004) (voicing that because there are an 
infinite number of ways to express and conceive any idea, the writers face a 
tremendous burden to prove that the nature of their workplace necessitated such 
expression). 
 180. Cf. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 771 (1998) (Thomas, J. 
dissenting) (rejecting the majority’s vague affirmative defense to sexual harassment 
because the rule drew no support from established legal principles and did not 
explain how employers could rely on the affirmative defense thus leading to 
confusion). 
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chill creative speech because employers will be forced to limit the 
content of workplace discussions and writers will be forced to censor 
themselves.181  On the other hand, employers could under-regulate 
the workplace and employees might not police their own conduct 
because neither group knows the scope of the creative necessity 
defense and views it as overly protective.182 
Courts should not apply the creative necessity defense to hostile 
work environment sexual harassment claims because it cannot be 
interpreted narrowly.183  If this newly minted defense is recognized by 
courts, it will potentially emasculate Title VII and FEHA because by 
allowing employers to deny employment opportunities, slow 
diversification of writers’ rooms, cause minority employees strife, 
preserve male-dominated fields, and adversely affect the interest of 
employees, employers, and the public. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. The Creative Necessity Defense Will Maintain Sexism in the 
Television Industry 
Hollywood remains fraught with sexism184 and the Court of 
Appeal’s creative necessity defense will entrench the “boys club” 
atmosphere of television writing.185  Male comedy writers have 
dominated the field of sitcom writing for decades, while females have 
had great difficulty breaking into the field.186  If comedy writers are 
                                                          
 181. See Brief for Alliance, supra note 172, at 41 (illustrating that the creative 
necessity defense will force comedy writers to ask themselves before speaking: 
"Should I say this potentially offensive thing, that might be funny enough to be part 
of the script, or will it be considered not good enough to be written down, thereby 
subjecting me, and my employer, to potential liability?”). 
 182. See Frank, supra note 101, at 495 (arguing that vague legal standards in 
sexual harassment law may cause employers to overlook harassing conduct since they 
do not know what is prohibited). 
 183. Cf. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 387 (5th Cir. 1971) 
(explaining that Congress meant to limit the affirmative defenses to Title VII because 
it did not intend to open an enormous gap in the law that would exist if employers 
could legitimately discriminate against a group solely because his employees, 
customers, or clients did). 
 184. See Laurie Winer, The Industry Women on the Side, L.A. MAG., Sept. 2002, 
available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1346/is_9_45/ai_65091736  
(reporting that the male partner of Endeavor Talent Agency described the company’s 
ethos as “we fight and fuck”).  Hollywood executives and producers do not hire 
women, do not see it as a problem, and never will. Id. For example, one producer 
said, “Women on film? Either naked or dead. Both are better.”  Id. 
 185. See Grossman, supra note 153 (arguing that permitting traditionally male 
environments that are hostile to women to remain in that state frustrates the goals of 
anti-discrimination law because it prevents the workplace from equally welcoming 
men and women). 
 186. See Writers Guild of America, 2005 Hollywood Writers Report, at 46, available 
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entitled to assert the creative necessity defense, a more lenient sexual 
harassment standard, women could be deterred from joining the 
industry.187  Furthermore, the effects of the creative necessity defense 
will have ramifications for consumers.188  The television shows that 
Hollywood produces reflect the sexism that plagued the “Friends” 
writers’ room, as evidenced by the violent male aesthetic that 
dominates last season’s new television programs.189  By maintaining 
the status quo in the writers’ room, the creative necessity defense will 
encourage production studios to continue telling stories from the 
narrow perspective of white, middle-class males. 
B. The Creative Necessity Defense Will Make it More Difficult for Lyle 
to Assert a Successful Sexual Harassment Claim and Collect Damages 
The creative necessity defense should not apply to Lyle’s claim 
because it would establish a higher level of protection for employers 
facing a hostile work environment claim, while making it more 
difficult for the plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of sexual 
harassment.190  Although a reasonable trier of fact would recognize 
that the defendants would legitimately engage in some sexual 
conversations to write “Friends,” a creative necessity defense could 
insulate all sexually-themed discussions or displays of pornography, 
even when it is unrelated to job performance.191 This will unfairly 
                                                          
at http://www.wga.org/subpage_whoweare.aspx?id=922 (finding that the top shows 
for women staff writers were more likely to be dramas than comedies); Writers Guild 
of America, Women’s Share of Employment 1998-2004, available at http://www.wga. 
org/uploadedimages/who_we_are/womens_employment_share.jpg (calculating that 
women currently comprise 27% of all television writers). 
 187. See Grossman, supra note 153 (arguing that giving writers carte blanche to do 
anything no matter how offensive and degrading to women runs the risk of creating 
an environment in which no woman would want to work); No ‘Friends’ In This 
Lawsuit, CBS NEWS, Dec. 23, 2004, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004 
/12/23/entertainment/printable662668.shtml (relating that on sitcoms dominated 
by men, where the tone is often angry and anti-female, women have the choice to 
suffer a “mean room” or leave). 
 188. See Catherine A. MacKinnon, Smut’s Insidious Threat, L.A. TIMES, March 20, 
2005, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/suncommentary/la-
op-discrimination20mar20,1,2183704.story?coll=la-headlines-
suncomment&ctrack=1&cset=true (arguing that the single most powerful force in 
undercutting sex equality at work remains the cultural sexualization of women by 
major corporations and mainstream media infusing pornography into daily life). 
 189. See Lisa De Moraes, Female Characters Made to Suffer for Our ‘Art,’ WASH. 
POST, Sept. 18, 2005, at N1 (commenting that men have fashioned a trend in 
Hollywood to show women raped and murdered, tortured in chains while wearing a 
dog collar, and impaled on the ceiling before bursting into flames). 
 190. Cf. Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of 
America v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 198 (1991) (stating that the business 
necessity defense is more lenient for employers to prove, while the impact approach is 
more difficult for plaintiffs to satisfy). 
 191. See Timmons, supra note 47, at 1205 (recognizing that only in a very unusual 
workplace, such as Playboy, could it be said that an employer legitimately utilized 
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raise the standard for plaintiff employees in creative environments, 
requiring Lyle to prove conduct that goes well beyond what is 
considered objectively hostile in other environments.192 
Furthermore, the creative necessity defense will allow employers to 
avoid damages for creating and maintaining hostile work 
environments.193  For Lyle, compensatory and punitive damages are 
the only damages recoverable because she cannot point to a tangible 
employment action directly caused by the harassment suffered. 194  
Permitting Warner Brothers and the writers to raise the creative 
necessity defense will allow the defendants to avoid damages for 
hostile work environment sexual harassment by reframing Lyle’s 
claim as one of disparate impact, not disparate treatment.195  
Consequently, these circumstances would discourage employers from 
enforcing federal and state sexual harassment policies in creative 
workplaces because they know they could escape judicial scrutiny and 
avoid damages.196  The creative necessity defense is not only 
inconsistent with recovering damages under hostile work 
environment claims, but it also undermines Congress’s intent of 
deterring sexual harassment.197 
                                                          
sexual conversations or the display of pornography).  But see Williams v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 564 (1999) (stating that women working in a blue collar 
profession do not deserve less protection from the law than women working in a 
courthouse).  The view that the standard for sexual harassment varies depending on 
the work environment should be rejected. Id. 
 192. See Williams, 187 F.3d at 564 (contending that women employed in 
professions where crude language is commonly used by male employees will have 
more difficulty establishing a hostile work environment because this will mean that 
the more hostile the environment, and the more prevalent the sexism, the more 
difficult it will be to prove that sex-based conduct is sufficiently severe and pervasive). 
 193. See White, supra note 85, at 739 (rejecting the idea that hostile work 
environment claims should be equated with disparate impact claims because Oncale 
precludes employers from positioning claims as impact based in sexual harassment 
cases). 
 194. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(1) (2006) (providing that a plaintiff may seek 
compensatory and punitive damages against an employer who engaged in unlawful 
intentional discrimination, but these damages cannot be recovered from an employer 
whose employment practice is unlawful because of disparate impact); see also H.R. 
Rep. No. 102-40(I), at 65-69 (1991) (discussing the need for damages to compensate 
victims of sexual harassment). 
 195. See White, supra note 85, at 739 (discussing why Congress amended Title VII 
to provide a remedy for sexual harassment plaintiffs and explaining that they believed 
such damages were necessary because hostile work environment victims had no 
remedy for statutory violations because Title VII only permitted recovery for equitable 
relief). 
 196. Cf. Howard Wasserman, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and John Doe Defendants: A 
Study in Section 1983 Procedure, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 793, 798-800 n.37 (noting that 
damages ensure that the actor’s conduct will not escape judicial scrutiny). 
 197. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2(1), 105 Stat. 1071 
(1991) (finding that additional remedies are needed to deter unlawful harassment 
and intentional discrimination in the workplace). 
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C. The Supreme Court of California Must Abandon the Creative 
Necessity Defense and Follow the Oncale Precedent 
The Supreme Court of California should have addressed and 
nullified the creative necessity defense because Oncale takes into 
account whether the defendants’ communications are actually 
necessary to writing an adult-oriented situation comedy.198  Applying 
the Oncale social context standard, in theory, will lead the court to 
treat factually similar cases the same way.199  Thus, following this legal 
precedent will resolve the problems that arise from the creative 
necessity defense’s vagueness and prevent the trier of fact from 
reaching unpredictable decisions, such as allowing the defendants to 
avoid liability and damages or punishing the defendants for words 
that are ultimately edited from the final story line. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeal’s creative necessity defense disregards the 
federal and state statutory mandate to promote and enforce civil 
rights because it will allow employers in creative industries to exclude 
women and minorities from the workplace. Because existing law 
already takes into consideration whether harassing conduct is 
necessary for a business, drawing a line between “creative” and other 
workplaces is not legally sound. Creative necessity cannot serve as a 
legitimate legal defense to hostile work environment sexual 
harassment claims because it undermines the current laws against 
employment discrimination. 
                                                          
 198. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998) 
(asserting that, with common sense, a judge or jury can determine if the alleged 
harassment within the specific workplace context amounted to discrimination). 
 199. See Frank, supra note 101, at 497-99 (arguing that examination of workplace 
culture increases uniformity in close cases because it clarifies the boundaries between 
lawful and unlawful conduct). 
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